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Summary findings
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poor. Without successful intraprovincial targeting,  reallocation and decentralized targeting.
however, even dramatic redistribution from rich to poor  Funding and program design changes led to large gains
provinces can have little impact on poverty nationally.  for the poor, although with diverse performance across
However, data for assessing performance at provincial  provinces.
level are often far from ideal. Can a centralized  Program funding and design choices by the central
government monitor the performance of decentralized  government can greatly affect the targeting performance
social programs in reaching the poor when their benefit  of decentralized social programs. The allocation to a
incidence is unobserved?  province should depend on how successful it is at
Ravallion shows that the poverty map and the  reaching the poor with the extra resources, rather  than
corresponding  spending allocation across geographic  how poor it is.
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allocations to the poor versus the nonpoor.  The national  governments to target resources to the poor. Finding
measure of targeting performance is also subgroup-  feasible ways to monitor their performance and adjust
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Ravallion uses an application to an antipoverty  to better outcomes for poor people.
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Argentina.1.  Introduction
National  anti-poverty  programs  often  rely heavily  on provincial  governments.  The center
targets  poor provinces,  in the hope that they will reach their own  poor. It is known,  however,
that without successful  intra-provincial  targeting  efforts,  even  dramatic  redistributions  from rich
provinces  to poor ones can have little impact  on poverty  nationally. 2 Outcomes  will depend  on
the behavior  of provincial  governments. 3 One can expect  provinces  to differ in relevant  ways.
Some  will care more about  the poor than  others, or face  different  constraints  in their efforts  to
reach the poor. Indeed,  having  a high incidence  of poverty  can result in worse  targeting
performance  (Ravallion,  1999). While  the decentralization  of targeting  decisions  can allow local
infonnation  to be exploited,  some  provinces  will be better  able  to secure such gains  than others.
Central  monitoring  of provincial  performance,  and use of the information  to encourage
better  performance,  can thus be crucial  to success  in reaching  the poor. However,  the data at
hand can be very limited,  either  because  no household  surveys  were done,  or they did not ask the
right questions  at the right times,  or because  the surveys  are not representative  at provincial  level.
So benefit incidence  between  the poor and non-poor  will often  be unobserved  (by either  the
center or the provinces).  This can severely  constrain  contracts  with the provinces  for assuring
maximum  impact  on poverty  nationally. A poorly-informed  center  might also be inclined  to
assume  the worst;  imperfect  information  about  outcomes  can then lead to under-funding  of anti-
poverty  programs.
2  For evidence  see  Ravallion  (1993)  (for  Indonesia)  and  Datt  and  Ravallion  (1993)  (for  India).
3  This  point  is well  recognized;  "Since  the central  authorities  do not  control  the local  authorities,
the effects  of federal  programmes  need  not  be those  intended;  and  the  central  authorities  must  take  the
reactions  of the communities  into  account"  (Atkinson  and Stiglitz,  1980,  p.55 1).  For discussions  of this
2This paper proposes a measure of targeting performance for situations in which benefit
incidence is unobserved.  It is usually feasible to track spending across local government areas
within provinces.  Poverty indicators for those areas might then be based on large sample surveys
or census data.  4  However, the poverty data do not include program participation. The proposed
measure of targeting performance is the regression coefficient of spending on the poverty rate
across areas within a government's boundaries. Conditions are identified under which this
regression coefficient reveals benefit incidence. The paper also shows that the overall (national)
measure of targeting performnance  can be exactly decomposed into between-province and within-
province components. This allows policy makers to assess the contribution of the center's
provincial allocation - versus intra-provincial targeting - to overall performance.
The following section defines the measures of targeting performance and the conditions
under which they correctly reveal benefit incidence. Section 3 puts these tools to work in
monitoring a World Bank financed anti-poverty project in Argentina. Section 4 concludes.
2.  Measuring Targeting Performance without an Incidence Survey
Consider a goveirnent  that has a budget for a social program. This budget is to be
allocated between the poor and non-poor within the government's boundaries. Those boundaries
embrace a set of finer geographic areas; these might be provinces, if we are monitoring the
central government, or municipalities if we are monitoring a provincial government.  The
government decides how much should go to each of the poor and non-poor within its
and related issues  concerning  fiscal federalism  see Brown  and Oates  (1987),  Wildasin  (1991), Bird et al.,
(1995), Inman  and Rubinfeld  (1997)  and Keen and Marchand  (1997).
4  The poverty  map might  be constructed  from the census  by extrapolating  from a smaller living
standards  survey  following  the method  of Hentschel  et al. (1998).
3jurisdiction. However, what we observe as data are not these allocations, but only the total
expenditures across each of the geographic areas which lie within the government's boundaries,
and the poverty rates across those areas, i.e., the geographic poverty profile.
To fill in the missing data we will have to make some assumptions.  The government's
(unobserved) optimal allocation to a household can be assumed to depend on that household's
level of welfare. That may in turn depend on where the household lives, but I assume that the
poverty rate in the area where it lives does not matter to a household's allocation independently
of its own level of welfare.5 In other words, there is no "poor-area bias" in that a poor person
living in a poor local-government area expects to get the same amount from the program as an
equally poor person living in a rich area of the same province.  The same holds for the non-poor.
This assumption can be thought of as a form of horizontal equity within provinces.
The following observations can be made about this assumption:
(i) While "poor-area bias" is ruled out, that does not mean that the government ignores
the differences in poverty incidence between areas when making its disbursements.  Indeed, that
may well be the key information it uses.  However, it is assumed that the government is not
biased by those differences in making its allocations. A poorer area will still receive more from a
government that is targeting the poor, but simply because there are more poor people in that area.
(ii) It is an assumption about the behavior of the level of government that actually
decided how the program's  resources should be allocated between the poor and non-poor.
Suppose that each province in a federal system allocates its budget between the poor and non-
5  Notice  that I say " independent"  which is a stronger  assumption  than "uncorrelated". Strictly,
the method  below requires  that the deviations  from the mean are uncorrelated  with either the incidence  of
poverty  or its squared values.  That is implied  by independence.
4poor. -It is assumed that there is no "poor-area bias" within any given province.  However, there
may well be such a bias between equally poor people living in different provinces, depending on
the inter-provincial differences in behavior, and the center's budget allocation.  Horizontal
inequity between provinces is still possible. I will return to this point.
(iii) The assumption rules out effects of the programn  on migration within provinces. If
there is no difference in expected allocations for otherwise identical households then they will
have no incentive to move. Migration effects may however be of concern between provinces.  In
the case of the Argentinean program to be studied later, its size and temporary nature make it
unlikely that it affects residential locations, so one can abstract from this complicating factor in
the analysis. However, this may be less plausible in other applications. Larger redistributive
interventions at province level could result in migration and (hence) fiscal externalities; this
raises a rather different set of issues for central government policy (Wildasin, 1991).
Let us first consider how to measure the targeting performance of each province, under
the assumption of horizontal equity in expectation.  The central government allocates a total
budget of G per capita across M provinces such that Gj per capita is received by province j.  After
that, each province decides how much should go to the poor versus the non-poor.  The chosen
allocation by province j is G,.  per capita for the non-poor and GjP  for the poor.  Province j
comprises Mj local government areas, which I call "departments".  The per capita allocations to
department i (=1,.., Mj ) within provincej  can be written as:
G'  = G' +  £,  (1)
G,W  = GP + eiP  (2)
5for the non-poor and poor respectively, where the s's are the departmental deviations from the
province means.
Total disbursements to the poor and non-poor must exhaust the budget. This creates an
accounting identity linking total program expenditure per capita to the poverty rate in a
department. Let GU  denote spending in the i'th department of the  j'th  province, and let the
corresponding poverty rate be Hy - the "headcount index", given by the proportion of the
population that is poor (for which the overall poverty rate in the province is Hj). Then:
GD  = HjjGiP  + (I1-  HD)Gi,  (3)
Using equations (1) and (2) we can re-write (3) in the form of a simple linear regression:
G,1  - Gj = Tj  (Hy - Hj) + vjj  (4)
where
viJ6!  + (,o,  - -u)  Hjj  (5)
andT  =G  - G,  is the absolute difference in the average allocation to the non-poor versus the
poor in that province. If  Tj is negative then the program favors the non-poor in absolute terms; if
Tj  is positive, then the program favors the poor, and the higher the targeting differential, the more
provincial spending favors the poor. I will call Tj the "targeting differential".
How can the targeting differential be estimated? Under the horizontal equity assumption,
the error term given by (5) will have zero mean for any given province and be uncorrelated with
Hy (since the e's are zero-mean errors within any given province and are uncorrelated with both
Hy and its squared value).  Thus Hy is exogenous in (4) and so one can estimate T, from an OLS
regression of GU  on Hu across all departments within a given province.  Equation (5) indicates
6that the error term will not be homoskedastic although this can be dealt with in estimating the
standard error of the targeting differential.
Analogously to these province-specific targeting differentials, one can estimate the
center's inter-provincial targeting differential, T',  by regressing the program allocation across
provinces Gj (f=1,..,M) on the provincial poverty measures HI (j=l,..,M).  This is a natural
measure of how much the center's allocation matches the provincial poverty map.
However, Tp cannot be interpreted the same way as the provincial targeting differentials
unless one makes a stronger assumption. Analogously to the province-specific targeting
differentials discussed above, horizontal equity between provinces is sufficient for the OLS
estimate of Tp to consistently estimate the difference between the mean allocations to the poor
and non-poor over the whole country. However, absence of poor area bias within each province,
clearly does not imply that equally poor people in different provinces will receive the same
amount in expectation.  Differences between provinces in their distributional objectives, and in
the constraints they face (including the amount received from the center), could readily produce
horizontal inequality in the treatment of equally poor people in different provinces.  To some
extent, the center will be able to get around these.differences through its spending allocations
across provinces and other administrative efforts made by the center to try to assure that
provincial behavior is in line with the center's objectives. However, since the center does not
actually decide who gets how much under the program, we cannot be confident that horizontal
equity at the national level will emerge.
One can construct a test, by using equation (4) to measure the extent of horizontal
inequality between the expected program allocations to departments with the same poverty
7measure but in different provinces.  Let H* denote a fixed reference value of H.. The expected
allocation to a department with poverty rate H' is then:
Gj* = Gj + Tj (H  -H,j)  (6)
In turn, we know that:
G=  H*G.  +(1-H*)G7  (7)
Under inter-provincial horizontal equity, both  G' and G, will be uncorrelated with Hj.  Although
we do not observe either GjP  or G,  it can be seen from (7) that Gj*  is a fixed-weight combination
of the two.  So a testable implication of inter-provincial horizontal equity is that  G i  is
uncorrelated with Hj. I will test this implication.
One can also estimate a national, inter-departmental, targeting differential,  TD, by
regressing the values of G.on  1nH  across all departments, irrespective of their province. Again
this cannot be given the same interpretation as the provincial targeting differentials unless there
is also horizontal equity across provinces. However, the estimate of TD still gives a useful
summary statistic of overall performance in targeting poor areas, reflecting both the center's
targeting of provinces and the (potentially diverse) performance of provinces in targeting the
poor.  Indeed, the OLS estimate of the national poor-area targeting differential, TD,  can be
decomposed exactly into between province and within province components as follows:
?D  =  SpTP + 1 sjT1 (8)
between  within
provinces provinces
where  Sp is the between-province share of the total (inter-departmental) variance in poverty
rates, and the Sj's are the province-specific shares. The formulae for the targeting differentials
8and their weights in (7) are given in Table 1; proving that the decomposition holds is
straightforward (for details see Ravallion, 1998, Appendix).
Table 1: Decomposition of the National Poor-Area Targeting Differential
Decomposition:
tD  _sPiP  +  Sjij
Targeting differentials  Weights
(regression  coefficients  of public spending  on  (shares  of the geographic
the poverty  rates across geographic  areas)  variance  in poverty)
Inter-departmental
D =  (G  - G)(Hj, - H)2 -
(H,j  - H)l-
Inter-provincial
Mp  E  (Gj -G)(Hj  -H)  - E  Mj(H,  -H) 2
E M  j  (H j  - H)2  E  E  ~~(Hjj  - H)
Intra-provincial
M 1 fi  M)
E  (Gy - Gj)(HQj  - Hj)  Z(Hj  -_Hj)2
(H,  -Hj)  S(H  - j)2
Note: GU  is program  expenditure  per capita  in the ith department  of thejth province.  The mean for that
province is Gj and the national  mean is G. Provincej contains  Mj departments.  Hy is the poverty  rate (the
"headcount  index") in the i'th department  of provincej, with province  mean  Hj and the national  mean is
H. Indexing  of the summations  is only given  when there is any ambiguity.
Notice that for the decomposition to be exact, the estimate of Tp must be weighted by the
number of departments in each province (Table 1). The weighting is readily done by multiplying
all variables (including the intercept) by the square root of the number of departments prior to
running the regression of the Gj'  s on the Hj'  s across provinces.
9Suppose we also want to compare two programs. In addition to the poverty rates being
exogenous, suppose that they are also fixed, with the same values for both programs. For
example, they are poverty rates measured before either program was introduced (as in the
empirical application below). Then Sp and the Sj's are also fixed. So one can also decompose the
changes in TD straightforwardly as:
ATD =  S  ATp  + E SjATj  (9)
where A denotes the difference between the two programs.
We will next see how these measures might help in assessing targeting perfonnance
before and after reform and expansion to an anti-poverty program in Argentina.
3.  Application to Argentina's Trabajar Programs
3.1  The Programs
With financial and technical support from the World Bank, the Government of Argentina
introduced the Trabajar II program in May 1997. This was a temporary employment program in
response to a sharp increase in unemployment. There was also evidence that this was hurting the
poor. For example, while the average unemployment rate reached 17% in 1996 in Greater
Buenos Aires, it was 40% amongst the poorest income decile. Trabajar II replaced a smaller prior
program, Trabajar I.  In addition to a greater overall budget, a number of features of Trabajar I
were changed. The poverty focus was strengthened, putting greater emphasis on reaching poor
areas.  Poverty measures were included in the center's budget allocation rules and in the selection
criteria for sub-projects.  The poverty focus was also made clearer to provincial administrators.
10- Trabajar II aimed to reduce poverty in two ways. Firstly, it tried to develop badly needed
community infrastructure and services in poor areas. The subprojects were proposed by local
governmental and non-governmental organizations that had to cover the non-wage costs.  The
projects had to be technically viable, and were chosen on a competitive basis according to a
points system set by the center.  Points were given according to: the poverty rate for the
municipality in which the proposed project was located (using a census-based measure described
in the next section), the type of project proposed, willingness to work for a wage below the
maximum, and how much the area had already received from the program. The participating
workers could not be receiving unemployment benefits or be participating in any other
employment or training program.  It is unlikely that a temporary program such as this would
affect residential location.
Secondly, by providing short-term work at relatively low wages on these community
projects, the program aimed to self-select unemployed workers from poor families.  The wage
rate on the program was set at a level that would be unlikely to attract non-poor workers, even
when unemployed, or attract poor workers out of regular jobs.  A subsequent assessment of
where participating workers came from in the national distribution of income found that 80%
were from the poorest 20% of families nationally, and that 50% came from the poorest decile
(Jalan and Ravallion, 1999).
The reforms resulted in sizable changes in the center's budget allocation across provinces.
Figure 1 plots spending per capita under Trabajar II (May-October 1997) against that under
Trabajar I for 22 provinces. While there is a positive correlation (of 0.58, significant at the 5%
level), there were some large changes in the provincial allocation. Later we will see how
effective these were in improving the program's ability to reach poor areas.
11Figure 1: Changes  in Program  Spending  Across  Provinces
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The benefits to the poor from this program will depend in part on the ability of local
communities (at subprovincial level) to propose and cofinance viable projects.  Better off areas
will undoubtedly have a comparative advantage in this respect and so be the first to gain. Poorer
provinces tend to be more severely constrained in cofinancing projects. (There is a correlation of
-0.73 between the share of total sub-project costs that was cofinanced and the provincial poverty
rate, using the measure described below). Thus the germ of a possible problem in reaching poor
areas lies at the heart of the program's design, whereby the center only provides the labor share
of the cost of sub-projects, leaving the cofinancing up to local areas.  To some extent the design
features of Trabajar II, including preferential treatment of project proposals from poor areas, will
have helped get around this problem.
The project management was decentralized at provincial level with budget constraints
and the overall rules (notably the points system) set by the center. Interviews with numerous staff
12of the program offices  at both national  and provincial  levels suggested  that the efforts  of
provincial  managers  to get good projects  from poor municipalities  within  their province  were
likely  to be crucial  in determining  the targeting  differential. Active  involvement  of the
provincial  office  appears  to have helped  greatly  in generating  project  proposals  from poor areas,
and assuring  that they are technically  viable. The provincial  office can then help in securing
funding  for the non-wage  costs from other (national  and  provincial)  programs. It was clear from
these interviews  that in some  provinces  the local managers  are professional  technocrats  who aim
to implement  the program's objectives  in an efficient  way.  In other  provinces,  however,  they are
more swayed  by national  or local politics  in deciding  which  areas should  get most attention.
3.2  Targeting Differentials Before and After Program Reform and Expansion
The methods  proposed  in section  2 can help assess  how well Trabajar  II performed  in
reaching  the poor, and whether  there was an improvement  over Trabajar  I. The empirical  work
reported  below draws on data  for Trabajar  I and the first six months  of Trabajar  II, May 1997-
October  1997.  The work was done as part of the project's concurrent  monitoring  and evaluation,
and  the results were rapidly available  to the project's  management  team; the following  analysis
was being reviewed  with the government's  project  team in the Ministry  of Labor on a Bank
supervision  mission  in November  1997. The quality  of the information  system for project
monitoring  set up by Ministry's project office made such  rapid feedback  possible.
The analysis  requires  project-monitoring  data  on disbursements  by local government  area
and a poverty  map for the same  areas. The geographic  level below  the province  in Argentina  is
the "department",  of which  there are 510 nationally.  A poverty  measure  is available  at
department  level, namely  the proportion  of households  with "unmet  basic  needs" (UBN),  based
13on the 1991 census.  This is a composite index of residential crowding, sanitation facilities,
housing quality, education attainments (of adults), school enrollments (of children), employment
and dependency.  Since it is based on the census, the index covers the whole population, and so
is representative at department level.  (By contrast, none of the household surveys for Argentina
are representative at that level, or even for all provinces.) The UBN index is the main poverty
data used by provincial offices in setting priorities for Trabajar sub-projects; maps of the index
by department are often displayed in provincial Trabajar offices. The index is somewhat out of
date, although this has the advantage that one can safely treat it as exogenous to the program.
Also the composition and weighting of the component indicators is not beyond question.
Let us first look at how the budget allocation between provinces changed with the
program's  reform and expansion. Under Trabajar I, the regression of spending per capita on the
poverty rate gives an estimated inter-provincial targeting differential (Tn)  of $25 per person,
which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level (t-ratio=2.12).6 (Recall that, under the
inter-provincial horizontal equity assumption discussed in section 2, the OLS estimate of Tp is a
consistent estimate of the difference in average allocations to the poor and non-poor nationally.
Later we will see whether the data are consistent with the inter-provincial horizontal equity
assumption.) The targeting differential rose appreciably in Trabajar II, for which the estimated
Tp is $74 per person, which is highly significant (t-ratio=4.85). 7 The implied allocation to the
non-poor was not significantly different from zero for either program (t-tests of 0.19 and 1.21 for
6  As expected,  the residuals  in estimating  this and the other  targeting  differentials  indicated
heteroskedasticity.  All of the t-ratios  reported  below are based on White standard  errors,  corrected  for
any general type of heteroskedasticity  present  in the data.
14Trabajar I and II respectively). Thus the program expansion and reforms resulted in almost a
three-fold increase in the implicit allocation to poor households.
Since the reforms included considerable effort at assuring that the program's  extra
disbursements were targeted to poor provinces, this improvement in the inter-provincial targeting
differential is not too surprising.  However, the allocation between provinces is far easier for the
center to control than is the allocation within provinces, which we turn to next.
Let us now ignore the provinces, and look at the allocation across all 510 departments.
The national targeting differential (TD  ) for Trabajar I is $41 and is significantly different from
zero (t-ratio=4.29). Under Trabajar II, the estimate of TD rose to $80 (t=10.33).
How much of this improvement in the inter-departmental targeting differential was due to
the improved performance in targeting poor provinces?  The between-provinces component
accounts for 28% of the total sum of squared deviations from the mean UBN index.  Clearly then,
reaching poor provinces alone cannot assure that poor departments will be reached. Using the
decomposition in Table 1, one finds that 17% (=0.28x25/41) of the interdepartmental targeting
differential of Trabajar I was attributable to the allocation between provinces; the rest was due to
targeting within provinces. Under Trabajar II, the share due to the center's targeting of provinces
rose to 26% (=0.28x74/80).  There was an increase in the contribution of the center's efforts to
target poor provinces to overall performance in reaching poor departments, though even so the
bulk of the national interdepartmental targeting differential was due to intra-provincial targeting.
7  These regressions  are weighted  by the number  of departments  (Table 1). The unweighted
estimates  of Tp were $15  (t=1.86)  for Trabajar  I and $60 (t=7.51)  for Trabajar  II.
15Turning to the changes over time, we have seen that A  TD -$39,  A  Tp =$50,  while
Sp =0.28.  Thus (using equation 9) one finds that $14 (36%) of the improvement in targeting
performance across all departments can be attributed to the center's success at better targeting
poor provinces. The remaining 64% was through better targeting within provinces.
Since the absolute level of spending is higher under Trabajar II, the poor will also be
better off than under Trabajar I even without the improved targeting.  Consider, for example, a
department in which 42% of the population have unmet basic needs - one standard deviation
above the national mean over all departments. Under Trabajar I, this department would expect
to receive $16 per person, over one year.  Under Trabajar II, the same department would have
received $32 per person, over five months, a gain of about $16 per person over Trabajar I.  While
there was a large absolute gain in the implicit allocation under Trabajar II, a share of this gain
was attributable to the higher total outlays on the program by the center.  With the Trabajar II
mean allocation, but no improvement in targeting performance (i.e., assuming that the targeting
differential for Trabajar II was the same as that for Trabajar I), one would have expected a
department with 42% unmet basic needs to have received $26.  So about $6 of the gain is due to
improved targeting, and $10 due to higher average outlay. ($ 10 being the difference between the
overall mean spending under Trabajar II of $20 and that under Trabajar I of $10.) To give a
second example, at a UBN rate of 58% (two standard deviations above the mean, and the poorest
5% of departments) the gain is about $23, of which $13 is due to the improved targeting. The
higher the department's poverty rate, the higher its gain from expansion and reform of the
program, and the higher the share due to the improved targeting.
16Figure 2: Targeting  Differentials  Before  and  After
Program  Reform  and Expansion
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We have  seen that  although  the allocation  across provinces  improved  under  Trabajar  II, it
remains  that  two thirds of the gain  in overall  performance  came from better  targeting  within
provinces.  The provinces  differed  greatly  in their success  at reaching  their poor.  To assess
changes  in the intra-province  spending,  Figure  2 plots the differentials  for Trabajar  II against
those  for Trabajar  1.8 Twelve  provinces  had targeting  differentials  not significantly  different  from
zero  under  Trabajar  I. Only  one province  had  a targeting  differential  which  was significantly  less
than  zero,  although  the differential  there  was still  small  (-0.09).
The number  of provinces  that were targeting  their poor rose  slightly  with the  expansion
and redesign  of the program  under  Trabajar  II (Figure  2).  While  the targeting  differential  was
significantly  positive  for nine provinces  in Trabajar  I, this  rose to  11 provinces  under  Trabajar  II.
There  were noticeable  improvements  in performance  for  12 provinces;  nine  of these  were
8  Detailed results by province can be found in Ravallion (1998).
17provinces  which  had a significantly  positive  targeting  differential  in Trabajar  I. There was also
considerable  re-ranking.  For example,  the province  with the highest  targeting  differential  in
Trabajar  I did not improve  its performance  in Trabajar  II, and was overtaken  by five provinces.
3.3  Horizontal Inequality Between Poor Areas in Different Provinces
As discussed  in section  2, one may well  find horizontal  inequalities  between  provinces  in
how much a poor department  with given poverty  incidence  receives  from the program. The
extent  of such  horizontal  inequality  provides  an indication  of how much  the federal system
constrains  the center  from achieving  its desired  transfers  to the poor nationally.  It also provides  a
test of the assumptions  underlying  my interpretation  of the inter-provincial  targeting  differential.
Figure 3: Horizontal Inequalities Between Equally Poor
Areas in Different Provinces
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18Consider a reference poor area with poverty rate H*, fixed across all provinces. Figure 3
plots the expected value of the program spending, G*  as implied by equation (6), for all provinces
ranked by their UBN index.  I give the results for three values of H*, namely 20%, 30% and
40%.9 Following the discussion in section 2, the correlation between G* and the actual poverty
rate is a testable implication of the inter-provincial horizontal equity assumption underlying my
interpretation of the inter-provincial targeting differential T  P.
Four observations can be made from Figure 3:
(i) There is considerable horizontal inequality, as indicated by the large differences in the
allocations to departments with the same poverty measure in different provinces. For example, a
department in which 40% of the people have unmet basic needs (about the fifth poorest
percentile in the distribution of poverty rates across departments) can expect to receive anything
from zero to five times the national mean allocation, depending on what province it belongs.
(ii) The absolute magnitude of the differences tends to be larger the poorer the reference
area one considers; the standard deviations (coefficients of variation) are 4.8 (42%), 8.4 (47%),
and 14.0 (5 8%) for H*s of 20%, 30% and 40% respectively.
(iii) In almost all provinces, the higher the value of H*  the higher the program allocation.
This is unsurprising, given that we have found that most provinces are targeting their poor.
(iv) There is no correlation between G* and how poor the province is; the correlation
coefficients between expected Trabajar II spending per capita in the reference poor area and the
province mean UBN are 0.1 1, 0.01 and -0.03 for H*s of 20%, 30% and 40% respectively.
9  The (unweighted)  mean UBN  is 22.5%  with standard  deviation  of 7.7%. I also tried H*s of 15%
and 50%;  these followed  the same patterns  described  below, but are omitted  to simplify  the figure.
19So, although we find considerable horizontal inequity, it is uncorrelated with provincial
poverty rates; the data in Figure 3 are consistent with horizontal equity in expectation between
equally poor departments found in provinces with different overall poverty rates. This offers
support for my interpretation of the inter-provincial targeting differential as the expected
difference between the amount going to the poor versus the non-poor nationally.
3.4  Postscript
The bulk of the analysis above was done after the first six months of the project's
implementation, so that results could feed back into the project.  Efforts were then made to
improve targeting performance in the lagging provinces. This was mainly done through
discussions and training seminars organized by the central project office with the aim of
strengthening provincial efforts at helping poor municipalities put up successful sub-projects.
The data are now available to measure the targeting differential for Trabajar II as a whole
(May 1997 to virtual project completion in July 1998). They follow a similar pattern to the data
for the first six months analyzed above, although with some signs of improvement. The targeting
differential for Trabajar II was found to be positive in 19 of the 22 provinces, and it had
improved when compared to Trabajar I in all except three provinces. The differential was
significantly positive (at the 5% level) in 13 provinces, and not significantly different from zero
in the rest.  The national inter-departmental targeting differential for Trabajar II was $110 which
is highly significant (t-statistic=10.91, n=503).
To help judge the extent of the poor-area targeting in Trabajar II, consider the poorest
department in Argentina, namely Figueroa (in Santiago Del Estero province) where the incidence
of unmet basic needs is 75.5%.  Figueroa received $86.80 per capita from Trabajar II. The least
20poor department was Chacabuco (in Chaco) where the incidence of unmet basic needs is 3.3%,
and $4.91 per person was received from the program.'0 Recall that the overall targeting
differential under Trabajar I was $41 (t=4.29). Thus, under Trabajar I, the poorest department
(with an incidence of unmet basic needs of 75.5%) would expect to receive $29.60 per person
more than the least poor province (in which 3.3% of the population have unmet basic needs).
Under Trabajar II, the poorest department would expect to receive $79.40 more per person than
the least poor department - a gain of almost $50 per person. So the changes to the program
greatly improved the extent to which it reaches poor areas.
4.  Conclusions
Geographically decentralized social programs can have diverse outcomes for the poor,
depending on the objectives and constraints facing provincial governments.  It is well recognized
in principle that this diversity in performance has important implications for the central
government's funding allocations and program design choices.  Yet the center is often poorly
informed about provincial performance in reaching the poor.  This lack of data on benefit
incidence can severely limit the options for designing contracts that will improve performance,
and it can also entail that poverty programs end up being under-funded.
This paper has proposed a measure of performance that can be estimated in certain
circumstances, even when the incidence of social spending is unobserved. The measure requires
data on the allocations of total spending by geographic area and a matching poverty map. One
10  These  are the actual  expenditures,  though the predicted  values  from the targeting  differential  are
very similar  because  these two departments  turn out to be very close to the regression  line. The  difference
in the Trabajar  allocation  to Figueroa  versus  Chacabuco  expressed  as a ratio to the difference  in poverty
rates is $113, which is very close  to the targeting  differential  (estimated  over all departments)  of $110.
21then regresses public spending on the poverty rates across areas. The interpretation of this
regression coefficient assumes that there is "horizontal equity" within provinces - meaning that
equally poor people in the same province receive the same amount in expectation, irrespective of
the incidence of poverty in the local areas in which they live. This is a defensible assumption at
provincial level (or whatever level the programs'  allocations are decided). It is less likely to hold
between provinces, although the method delivers a test for this case.
Under this horizontal equity assumption, the regression coefficient consistently estimates
a "targeting differential" given by the difference between the program's average allocations to
the poor and non-poor.  The paper has also shown how the national targeting differential across
all local government areas can be decomposed to allow an assessment of the contribution of the
center's targeting of provinces versus the efforts of the provinces themselves.
The paper has applied these methods to monitoring the performance of the "Trabajar II"
program in Argentina. A substantial reallocation of program resources across Argentina's
provinces occurred when Trabajar I was replaced by Trabajar II, entailing higher total spending
and programr  design changes which gave stronger incentives to reach the poor.  The revised inter-
provincial budget allocation under Trabajar II was more heavily influenced by differences in
provincial poverty indicators. The real wage rate for the work made available under the project
was maintained at a low level (a somewhat lower real value than the earlier program). A high
weight was given to proposals from poor areas in a points system for ex-ante assessment of the
competing sub-projects. And efforts were made to strengthen the capability of provincial offices
for helping poor areas mount projects, and to assure that provincial project managers were in
tune with the programs' overall goals.
22These changes resulted in a marked improvement in the program's success at reaching
poor provinces.  Performance in reaching the poor within provinces also improved in the
majority of provinces. Overall performance in reaching poor areas (irrespective of their province)
improved nationally.  For example, the difference between the program's disbursement to the
poorest area nationally versus the least poor increased by 170%.
On decomposing the national targeting differential one finds that only about one third of
the gain in the program's ability to reach poor areas was due to its greater ability to reach poor
provinces. The rest was due to better targeting of the poor within provinces.  Performance was
also diverse across provinces, with substantial gains in some provinces but not others.
Differences in provincial targeting performance were reflected in considerable horizontal
inequality between equally poor areas in different provinces, although this horizontal inequality
was uncorrelated with how poor the provinces are - supporting the interpretation given to the
inter-provincial targeting differential.
These results suggest that program funding and design choices by the center can matter
greatly to the targeting performance of decentralized social programs.  The allocation to a
province should depend on how successful it is at reaching the poor with the extra resources-
rather than how poor it is per se. Design choices should provide incentives for pro-poor targeting
by provincial governments.  Feasible ways of monitoring their performance, and adjusting the
center's efforts accordingly, can then be crucial to better outcomes for the poor.
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